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Abstract 
The term business group generally refers to conglomerate firms with multiple majority-
owned subsidiaries and minority-owned affiliates, engaged in a diverse array of business 
activities. 
A recent stream of literature explains the predominance of these structures, typical of the 
emerging and transitional, from socialist to market-based economies, as a result of their ability 
to neutralize market failures, and to act as substitutes for imperfect economic, social and 
political institutions. In emerging countries, interlocking ties among firms are often created in 
order to make available scarce or nonexistent material and immaterial resources, as emerging 
economies are unlikely to be endowed with the combination of factors that promotes 
entrepreneurial activity. According to this traditional view, the extent of product and 
geographical diversification of the groups leads to better economic performance in emerging 
and transitional economies.  
A main question is whether this causal nexus, from diversification to performance, is 
confirmed, or actually reversed in the case of Chinese business groups, due to the historical and 
institutional contingencies in act during the evolution of these groups. Many of them were 
formed under the encouragement or active pressure of the Chinese government, which selected 
the better performing firms to acquire bankrupt state-owned enterprises in related industries. To 
better understand the nature of the causal link, the study has been integrated with further 
research focused on the modality and outcomes of the transition from traditional SOEs to 
business groups. The literature screened offered empirical evidence based on longitudinal data 
analyses that supported both views on the causal relationship between diversification and 
performance for business groups in China.  
  
iv 
 
 
 Product and International Diversification of Business Groups in China:  
Antecedent or Consequence of Superior Performance? 
 
 
 
Paola Ghezzo 
 
Abstract 
1. Introduction: Summary. . .....2 
2. Significance to International Business  4 
 
3. .. ..5 
4. Business groups in China (qiyejituan, 企业集团) as centrally coordinated  
. 11 
5. Chinese business groups and business groups across developing countries  17 
6. Evolution of groups in China . 23 
7. Economic and political rationale  30 
8. bureaucracy impact factor on business groups.... 34 
9. Private sector and groups. 38 
10. Concluding remarks  41 
 
 
  
1 
 
1.  Summary. 
with multiple, 
majority-owned subsidiaries and minority-owned affiliates engaged in a diverse array of business 
activities.  Their size and breadth of interests can overlap or cover areas generally dedicated to a 
 Until recently, a widely accepted line of research attributed the 
dominance of such firms to institutional voids in emerging markets, with this strategic form of 
organization playing the role of micro institutions addressing the weaknesses in the governance 
systems of developing countries. In fact, emerging economies are unlikely to be endowed with 
the combination of factors that promotes entrepreneurial activity; successful entrepreneurship 
efforts are the outcome of the coincidence of functional market structures, availability and 
quality of financial and human capital, cultural propensity to support and regulate success and 
failures, and adequate property rights protection (Kummerle, 2005).  
A major proposition of the research is that the extent of product and geographical 
diversification of the groups leads to better economic performance in emerging and transitional, 
from socialist to market based, economies.  Amongst the other benefits of the size and scope, a 
more diversified firm is more likely to have sufficiently large internal capital and labor markets, 
and to make them function efficiently, supplying this way the efficient flexibility of resources, 
coupled with contained costs, essential for a successful growth process. Furthermore, the 
literature recently focused on the comparison between unrelated diversification and related 
diversification, seeing the second outperforming the first. About this last point there is no 
unanimous consensus; when jointly considered, both diversification strategies will add up in 
 growth (Li and Wong, 2003). 
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This idea has also been applied to the analysis of business groups in China, but extant empirical 
findings have given rise to more questions than answers. 
A main question is whether the proposed causal relationship  diversification leading to 
better performance  is in fact reversed in China, because many of the Chinese business groups 
were formed through a selection operated by the state, which also provided assistance for 
 structure. These groups of firms, characterized by the 
presence of a core firm, are historically often a consequence of the Chinese government
to encourage and sometimes pressure better-performing firms to acquire bankrupt state-owned 
enterprises in related industries, moved often more by social stability concerns than by 
profitability rationale.  
Policies aimed at promoting group affiliation under a strong performing State Owned 
Enterprise (SOE) became evident, particularly with the economic reforms undertaken after the 
, when the state promoted the creation of the so-called national champions, or groups 
centered on exemplary firms, to promote the growth of strategic industries locally, and their 
image globally.  
To better understand the nature of the causal link, the study has been integrated with 
further research focused on the modality and outcomes of the transition from traditional SOEs to 
business groups, passing through the form of shareholdings corporations, and including the 
effects from observations on the role of private groups. 
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Part of the literature screened offered empirical evidence based on longitudinal data 
analyses that supported both views on the causal relationship between diversification and 
performance for business groups in China.   
By classifying Chinese business groups into different types based on their institutional 
heritage, the research incorporated some critical institutional factors into the analysis and thus 
improved theoretical precision in this stream of research.  
2. Significance to International Business   
The main propositions of the study are significantly different from those that are often 
widely accepted in the field of international strategy and business. Its findings are expected to 
reflect recent relevant theoretical analyses for understanding the nature of business groups in 
emerging economies and their impact in the global economic scene.   
In order to analyze the topic of growth in transitional economies, 
framework, for the size of sample and political affinities with other emerging economies, well 
exemplifies a prevailing strategic choice, although its business group developmental model also 
presents unique traits. Studies of comparative corporate governance will have to include analyses 
of the new form of capitalism involved, often labeled as state capitalism, to provide models that 
better reflect the fast-moving Chinese business environment. 
Findings on these new organizational structures furthermore challenge existing theories 
on multinational enterprises (MNEs); theorizations on business groups sustain that not only 
scope, product and geographical, but also state involvement matters to promote 
development and growth (Yiu, 2010; Haveman et al. 2013). China recorded momentous 
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outward foreign direct investment.  
The line of research has important practical implications, both for the evaluation of 
diversification strategies and for government policies with regard to the development of business 
groups in emerging and transitional economies, offering a different insight to foreign entrants in 
the Chinese market. The study of the characteristics of these entities is functional in the process 
of deciding which Chinese business group to join, or the nature of competing firms in a foreign 
market. 
3. Strategic role of groups to the growth of the economy in developing countries. 
In developing economies, particularly in transitional economies, those changing from a 
centrally planned to a free market system, the uncertainty that characterizes the process of 
transition to market liberalization tends to produce an initial increase in the scope of business 
that in turn naturally brings firms to converge into groups, while conglomeration, or unrelated 
product diversification, in developed economies tends to destroy value (Khanna, Palepu, 2000; 
Peng et al., 2005). 
Policies enacted by the state to promote economic growth also generate opportunities for existing 
successful firms; the consequent development momentum acquired by incumbents, and state 
assisted firms, fosters a growing, powerful corporate sector (Carney, 2008).  
Until recently, most of the early empirical literature on the emergence of business groups 
in developing economies focused on their evolution as substitutes for imperfect economic, social 
and political institutions; these collections of firms are bound together entities created in 
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response to system inefficiencies, in terms of capital, labor, talent and technology market 
failures, and distribution problems.   
In emerging countries, interlocking ties among firms are often created in order to make 
available scarce or nonexistent financial and legal services, to facilitate the flow of information 
and exchange managerial expertise, to neutralize the perverse effect of risk, and to secure 
property rights guarantees.  Crucial in the economic justification of business groups is the release 
of an internal functional capital market, instrumental for the achievement of scope and scale 
economies and of central coordination services in developing markets. 
Peng, (1997, 2003), integrating approaches to firm growth theory, underlines that in 
developing economies, particularly in those undergoing a transition from central planning system 
to market competition, that to promote sustainable growth, a firm must build up strategic 
resources. A key concept remains that in advanced economies transaction costs are mitigated by 
the efficient functioning of the financial markets, where also firm ownership and property rights 
transfer is guaranteed by the existing and working institutions, inducing a successful, smooth 
process of acquisition.   
In emerging economies, to promote 
market failures, it is crucial the role of available skilled management, capable of supplying 
relationship networks. The main aim is to counteract those institutional inadequacies, balancing 
transaction costs and assisting access to capital, to obtain new levels of efficiency in order to 
compete in a global environment, and to achieve innovation and increase savings (Hoskisson, 
2005; Carey, 2008).  
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These types of economies are manifestly characterized by poor infrastructures, and 
policies dictated by the interaction of formal and informal institutions (defined by Helmke and 
the actual rules . The role of the state, main 
economic actor in this initial stage, is to release resources and information flows in support of 
strategic industries, and, through licensing and permissions, guarantee rights to protect and 
strengthen the position of local players initially, acting in a later moment as stimulus for 
innovation. The two types of infrastructures can be complementary and compatible with one 
another, producing economic environments apt, if not to enhance performance or supply 
services, then at least to allow a better functioning of the existing formal institutions, as happens 
in liberal market economies. In contrast, in developing countries formal and informal institutions 
often work against one another and their goals might be incompatible. For example, Russia 
displays an ill - functioning economic system due to those discrepancies, while in China 
its substitutive informal institutions, the business groups, act coherently with the formal 
institutions  goals, filling the institutional voids gap (Estrin, Prevezer, 2011). 
The microeconomic analysis says that during the economic expansion process, the newly 
formed industrial system develops around mainly acquired generic skills, with little or no 
proprietary competences, resulting in non-specialized, broad production, and leading to 
economies of scale and scope. At this stage, the main aim is the achievement of production 
efficiency toward the technological frontier, containing costs to attract market shares, but 
keeping in mind that to increase the product scope means to incur additional costs to manage the 
organization.  
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In Figure 1, the relation described by the technology frontier implies that higher level of 
positive synergies due to an additional unit of growth, for example an acquisition, will be 
associated to higher costs to manage and coordinate the new, expanded structure. The A 
equilibrium gives the optimal size; further growth (D3) would incur inefficient levels of MBCs. 
Size and breadth of economic activity matters, favoring and benefiting firms  
affiliation structures over single players in the market.   Later, the evolution of internal 
institutions coupled with state impulse can assist the group to develop the specific competitive 
advantages that characterize firms capable of competing in the global market.  
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 In the Two-Phase Model of Institutional Transition, the shift to the right of the cost-
benefits graph, as illustrated by Peng (2003), indicates the transition, through incremental 
evolution, to a new-rule based phase, or mode of exchange, with reduced uncertainty granted by 
the evolution of institutions. The evolution of new institutions is bound to produce in time new 
costs and a period of institutional turbulences.  T1 is the time when costs of transactions are high 
while benefits are low. It is necessary to build strong social networks in order to reduce costs and 
increase benefits moving toward C and a further positive transactions structure; from T2 to T3 
the economy benefits from relationship - based, non-formal contracting. In T3, to guarantee 
growth, the complexity of the new transaction system requires a shift to a new mode of 
production, which considers the new institutional changes; if this shift does not happen, group 
affiliation will still be beneficial, supporting the firms through this period of instability. 
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Depending upon the initial societal asset in place in the country, forces might act in the 
opposite direction, opposing resistance to drastic economic, and therefore political and social 
change, these forces act to maintain a privileged status quo, slowing down the process of 
liberalization or producing hybrids. Informal institutions, essential to supply market alternative 
instruments, often have a problem-creating role, via corruption, clientelism and lobbying forces.  
For example, during fast economic development in Brazil, attempts to preserve privileges and 
power led to poor governance effects, reflected at group level in excess of non-voting shares 
(exploitation of small shareholders) and poor company performance, frustrating the efforts to 
establish a functional capital market; only recently have enforced legal reforms restored 
confidence in the market.  
In Russia, corruption and lack of transparency hindered the initial efforts implemented in 
, market - oriented economy. Recent compliance with OECD 
standards has seen improving Russian accounting and judicial structures, and reforms are still 
undergoing; however, formal compliance with international requirements  does not imply a 
corresponding effectiveness of the measures in a country still plagued by lack of enforcement 
and corruption (Estrin, Prevezer, 2011). 
China, on the other hand, according to a relevant part of the economic doctrine, is 
producing a liberalized market influenced by the importance of political players at the local and 
centralized level. For example, there is an available working capital market, whose access is 
facilitated for those firms enjoying solid bureaucratic connections; the labor market also is 
evolving and acquiring mobility, but still has to satisfy the requirements to maintain the 
harmonious socialistic society formally invoked since 2006. 
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Crucial to the understanding of the Chinese  interaffiliates benefits 
distribution, and structure and performance causality mechanism, is the role of variables like the 
contribution of the state, the nature of affiliation, and the ownership typology. 
4. Business groups in China (qiyejituan, 企业集团) as centrally coordinated organizations. 
The China National Statistics Bureau (Chinese Government) defines business groups as a 
collection of legally independent entities that are partly or wholly owned by a parent firm and 
registered as affiliated firms of that parent firm; cross-ownership among affiliates is frequent. A 
broader definition includes the concept of collection or network of legally independent firms 
bound by coordinated economic and social, formal and informal ties (Granovetter, 1994). The 
links can be generated by different aspects of the production process, like cross or common 
ownership, interfirm products or resources exchanges, and financial ties, or dictated by social 
relations, like family, community or personal friendship. 
These strategic affiliations of firms, although similar to networks of firms and 
multidivisional groupings, differ because they are composed of independent legal entities, and 
present strict central coordination and financial and strategic dependence among affiliates. 
Strong advantages derive from the availability of developed distribution networks, and 
the circulation of technological innovation, brand names and marketing skills, elements that Yiu 
(2010) assimilates to ownership advantages, bound to benefit the network of firms, including the 
weakest components.   
Group membership, through inter-organizational relationships, assists the distribution of 
fixed costs for professional training, makes possible the reach of the available information about 
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products and transactions, and spreads group reputation benefits, both in terms of brand name 
and trust, and of credit ratings, making available a good-practice and reputation premium to all 
the affiliates e achieved, assisted by such a network of 
connections, is the result of generic expansion and internalization (Peng 1997).   
In a country like China, that formally recognized property rights only in 2004, with poor 
legal infrastructure and contract enforcement, and where management independence is normally 
difficult to maintain, the creation of an organizational structure, large enough to enjoy scale and 
scope economies, allows firms to efficiently bypass the institutional voids created by the scarcity 
of infrastructures otherwise guaranteed by advanced, functional governments. Groups also offer 
the type of soft infrastructures defined by Khanna and Palepu (1997) as the set of support 
services and actors that facilitate business operations, such as market research firms, training 
programs, research and logistics providers, executive recruiters, technical standards committees, 
product certification, and financial verification. These corporations supply to their affiliates the 
flow of information vital to the efficient conduction of business operations.  
Especially in transition countries, these organizational structures not only supply material 
and immaterial resources and services, but often more importantly act as buffers between 
political, social and economic powers, justifying a large support from the existing institutions 
that often promote their same creation, and grant them privileged allowances. In fact, while 
engaged in the  growth, the group often contributes to social advancement and provides 
resources and services instrumental to economic progress.  
Business groups act as resources providers for the associated firms and as intermediaries 
with state institutions because a group thrives on the basis of its ability to leverage institutional 
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relatedness. High institutional relatedness, as the degree of informal embeddedness or 
interconnectedness with dominant institutions, means that is present the dense network of ties 
and system of social connections with dominant institutions known as guanxi (Peng, Lee, and 
Wang- 2005).  
The tight connection with the state administration is of high interest to foreign firms 
willing to gain access to the Chinese market, as the widely connected business groups, more than 
single firms, attract entrants, offering the perspective of benefiting from state support. 
Consequent alliances with foreign firms allow positive bilateral exchanges, where the foreign 
entrant gains access to local business networks and established relations, while the business 
group acquires learning opportunities and links to foreign markets, implying that group 
membership rewards its components not only through the preferential connection with central 
and local government, but also releasing potential benefits from foreign collaborations. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) observe that the generic market-related reasons that justify the 
formation of the groups should be integrated by country - specific circumstances. In the case of 
China, other country - pertinent factors should be taken into account, such as the level of 
protectionism or the degree of competition. These factors affect the formation of business groups 
not only at a national, but also at a local level, as a consequence of the characteristic autonomy 
achieved by the provinces through the decentralization years. 
Taking into account that the aggregation of firms around the world assumes different 
forms, according to the prevalent economic, political and social conditions, the most prevalent 
market-oriented justification to the emergence of business groups in China has been integrated 
by studies based on state activism and firm endowments. This current trend of thought suggests 
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that a different grouping mechanism can be triggered by responses to market changes and to 
diverse state policies, or by the need to optimize the firms  internal resources in order to release 
its full growth potential (Penrose, 1995). As indicated by Xinqin and Xu (2011), because of its 
advantages, a business group can assume a privileged, successful position when the target is 
entering a new business or market. 
However, it would be reductive to justify Chinese business groups only as micro 
institutions, created to supply solutions to market voids. Chinese history, since the beginning of 
the economic reforms in 1978, suggests an evolution in the forms, encouraged 
and facilitated by the state. 
As suggested by Lee and Jin (2009), this approach develops previous studies and 
analyzes mainly strategic choices during the phase of transition from SOEs into business groups 
passing through the form of shareholdings companies1. They argue that business groups are 
prevalently composed of firms that previously enjoyed higher autonomy, faced a higher level of 
competition, had bigger size, lower indebtedness and better connections with the state, implying 
that only the champions in the market could be successful candidates for the ambitious state 
policies  attention. The group therefore would form around highly successful firms capable to 
share their growth potential with other affiliates, resulting in a highly successful group. 
                                                 
1 The doctrine generally accepts the assimilation of business groups into conglomerates; nonetheless Lee 
and Seog, (2008) introduce a main distinction that should be taken into account. The limited liability characteristic 
of 
divisions that show higher risk aversion.    
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Those are not, however, the sole variables characterizing the likelihood for firms to 
aggregate into business groups: other specific factors are linked to the path assumed toward the 
new form, whether carried out through mergers and acquisitions (M&A), spin offs or joint 
ventures (JV), as stressed by the China Academy of Social Science. According to this view, a 
firm s association in groups is not a mere passive reaction to market conditions, indicative of per 
se exogenous factors, but more a rational catch up instrument, mostly controlled by the 
government, to promote and speed up economic growth, and to make it easier to penetrate new 
markets or lines of business.  
A group can provide financial, technological, marketing and distribution assistance, and 
production support: in order to achieve this performance, the state should be active with 
favorable financial and fiscal policies. As a consequence, the firms that mostly benefit from 
affiliation are the weakest or the new entrants in a business: also, firms with more invasive state 
ownership benefit more from the affiliation (Carney et al, 2009). 
Carney (et al., 2009), also maintain that affiliation with a business group is advantageous 
insofar as it provides diminishing transaction costs granted by mutual contributions. Outlining 
the findings of recent studies, the authors state that while it is true that the strategic organization 
of firms facilitates access to scarce resources, and makes available close ties with both interfirms 
and governments, it is also true that the advantage provided declines over time. The rationale for 
 market failures, is diminished by the creation of formal 
institutions, as a natural and logical consequence of the advancement. 
Part of the literature, however, identifies business groups as autocratic corporations. 
According to this view, these groups aggregate with the aim of extracting rents, and despoil 
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minority shareholders and subordinate firms. The beneficial effects of concentrated ownership, 
primarily to reduce or eliminate the principal-agency problem, and to obtain a faster decision 
making process, can give way to perverse behaviors: membership in these groups can be 
detrimental, with observed tunneling behaviors, where corrupt management sets manipulating 
practices that function for its own benefit. Examples of these actions can be observed, especially 
in the case of listed firms, in certain mergers, block share sales at prices non-reflecting the value 
of the company, or any transaction that from a subsidiary tends to transfer resources or financial 
assets (for example loans) to the controller without a corresponding realistic valuation.  
Furthermore, heavy government intervention and managers formed on central-
government culture can inhibit innovation, and therefore competitiveness, to preserve 
employment: for example, the objective of harmonious growth pursued by the government 
makes layoff policies unpalatable for Chinese managers. Business group strategies might then 
result, consequently splitting into two categories, those linked to the central government culture, 
which tend to prevent social unrest at the cost of innovation, and those following a market 
approach, whose aim is to maintain and grow their market share in the increasingly competitive 
local and international market. Hoskisson(2008) reported that a recent trend wants to combine 
the two apparently conflicting economic and social aims, with business group managers moving 
towards a market-oriented mentality. 
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5. Chinese business groups and business groups across developing countries. 
 
The nature of the groups across countries differs for the prevailing cultural factors, the 
typology of connections among the composing firms, and the kind of affiliation that can be 
sanctioned formally or through informal social interconnections. Chinese strategic alliances are 
characterized by strong group culture, based on informal norms, and solidarity standards and 
trust, where even the core firm location matters. Interpersonal connections (guanxi) and family 
links are at the basis of successful social-professional economic networks, with particular 
directions imparted by the hand of the central or local governments. Also in China, as later 
indicated for other developing countries, defining the ultimate ownership of a firm and 
eventually of a group can be an issue, because of the high concentration of ownership and inside 
investors peculiar to these pyramidal structures. 
Compared to the business networks that developed in other countries, Chinese business 
groups present a lower degree of diversification, despite being composed often by firms 
apparently involved in unrelated industries. In fact, alliances with firms exposed especially to 
services and with welfare functions, are historically connected to the characteristics of the 
Chinese planned economy, where the responsibility of the state also involved the social-welfare 
aspect: exposure to those sectors (for example managing restaurants or schools) was therefore a 
requirement (Ma et al., 2005). 
 A closer review of the groups formed in the past two decades would reveal pertinent 
upstream and downstream firm s connections, as dictated by the state aspiration to create 
powerful local and international industrial scene competitors. 
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 The participation of affiliated companies can be different elsewhere, depending upon the 
influence of institutional investors, individuals, banks, and families. Around the world the 
prevalent form of business groups is aggregation of family controlled firms; these organizational 
structures are common throughout not only Asia, but also in most developing and transitional 
economies in the world. Chinese business groups were formed initially following the success of 
the Korean and Japanese aggregations, and were later developed, focusing on a more Western 
model (Lee, Hahn, Lin, 2001), with central planners  devoting particular care to contain poverty 
levels.  Chinese business groups and the other Asian counterparties are characterized by their 
own traits, involving mainly the stronger participation of local and central government into the 
entrepreneurial activities.  
 
Japanese Keiretsu 
In Japan, according to the model of government-guided capitalism (Baumhol et a. 2007), 
state authorities also actively intervened to form the local Keiretsu, intrinsic product of an 
administered economy (Carney 2008). Japanese Keiretsu differs from the parallel Chinese 
structures because there is not a centralized decision - making mechanism like the pyramidal 
structure of the business groups. Japanese groups are more interlinked companies, with corporate 
ownership often coordinated by a leading bank, while in China commercial banks cannot become 
shareholders of firms: the state controls enterprises and banks that consequently have no 
incentives to monitor performance, and bank loans are granted preferentially to state-
owned groups, with restrictions to loans access for privately owned or risky business.  
In Japan, managers and bureaucrats formed in the same elite schools where they 
developed ties that will produce professional bonds and affinities. The consequent strong 
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common corporate spirit, justified by the Japanese societal asset, develops high levels of loyalty 
to, and pride for the group, which mediates between the state necessity to govern and the market-
oriented company decisions. State intervention does not come about only through expressed 
intrusive policies, but can develop in symbiotic relationships involving the political and 
economic sphere (Evans , 1992).  
 
Korean Chaebol 
In Korea, the typical affiliation structure, the chaebol, is the outcome of strong state 
intervention; it was conceived between the 1960s and 70s under Park Chung Hee, with the intent 
of promoting a modern industrial state. A chaebol is represented by a group of firms under the 
control of one family giving financial and administrative direction; the structure contemplates 
owner families at the top, core holding companies on the next level and all other affiliates at the 
bottom. They are characterized by hierarchical management structures and complex dynastic 
ownership. 
ambitions to penetrate local markets; consequently, both are also controversial means to retain 
economic power in the hands of elites and elected families. These companies, through state 
intervention, enjoy a protected market, easy access to financial resources by guaranteed relations 
with banks, and favorable, tailor-made industrial policies.  
  In Korea in particular, the success of these group affiliations has brought about the 
successful creation of industrial concentrations of economic power. In 2010, according to the 
Federation of Korean Industries, the value of exports by the 30 largest chaebol accounted for 84 
percent of  overseas shipments (Bloomberg 2012), and by December, 2012, the top 
five chaebol, controlled assets worth 57% of GDP (Reuters, 2012).  
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The power accumulated and exerted by those industrial agglomerations, however, brought to the 
attention of the public the high level of government and business collusion (The Economist, Mar. 
2010). Political leaders, on the occasion of the presidential elections in 2012, acknowledged the 
cost of the rapid concentrated industrial success in terms of increasing difficulties for small 
businesses to thrive, a widening income gap, and the highest suicide rate in the developed world 
(Yoon, 2012).  
 
Indian Trading Houses 
Indian Trading Houses are another product of state-administered capitalism, although in 
India groups are granted fewer benefits than their Chinese competitors (Singh, Gaur, 2010); the 
social and political environment facilitated the formation of private groups. Indian economic 
assets tend to reflect the structure of oligarchic capitalism, dominated by business groups so 
large and powerful that often inhibit the economic ability of other firms (Steier, 2009).  
The emergence and success of groups in India is justified not only by market failures, but 
also as a side effect of perverse economic policies that interfered with the 
licensing, state restrictions, and weak and shallow capital markets regulated private businesses
expansion. For explicit regulations, and because of the lack of external institutions supporting 
entrepreneurial activity, the only way a firm could grow was diversifying its activities. 
A single family that controls and owns significant shares of listed firms in broadly 
diversified businesses characterizes most of the structures of these groups. As asserted by Peng 
and Jiang (2006), the high family ownership concentration has positive effects when legal 
institutions are weak. The vast territorial expansion of the state has also justified regional 
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differences, with difficulties in enforcing rights and implementing measures efficiently in 
different regions (Estrin, Prevezer, 2010). 
In India, the unification of ownership and control is more common than in China, due to 
the prevalence of private groups and of family - managed firms. Family or individual ownership 
indicates that the undiscussed strategy for Indian groups is profit maximization, while for the 
Chinese counterparts, characterized mostly by state ownership, we have seen that social goals 
might be privileged. 
 
Russian Business Groups 
 transition, also characterized by the presence of both private and state-owned 
business groups shaped into oligarchic financial industrial groups (Carney, 2008), was marked 
instead, since the beginning, by strict adherence to Western design and institutions, but without 
the cultural, social and political background apt to sustain the changes; the consequent rapid 
economic growth brought widespread poverty and widening of the gap between the haves and 
have-nots. The negative connotation generally attributed to the term oligarchy and oligarchs by 
the international press when referring to the Russian economic system and operators, although 
this trap should not affect the semantic original meaning of the economic-political definition of 
oligarchy, stems from the opaque pyramid mechanisms easily allowing to conceal the identity of 
the concentrated shareholder, which the dominant investors use to exercise control.  
Russian economic growth since the 1990s has been characterized by the failure of the 
rule of law and weak judiciary system, allowing managers to conduct business through legal but 
also illegal means, and concentrations of undeclared insider investors. This unclear ownership 
system, failures in law enforcement, and minority shareholders protection contributed to the 
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OECD demanding in 2005 the adoption of international standards to bring Russia to the status of 
a ; nonetheless, perverse prevailing practices, 
like the lack of enforcement and the gap between the reported economy and the effective real 
economy, still impede the efficient working of the formal institutions in place. (Further hostility 
to foreign intervention and investment is also transparent in some of the regulations: for 
example, it is rare for any company to have available in the market more than 20% of its shares 
in free float.) 
Although similarly relying upon informal institutions, Russia differs from Chinese 
development because the goals of its operators are conflicting, while in China state and company 
owners are generally oriented to fostering economic growth. 
Brazilian Grupos Economicos 
Most Asian developing countries adopted group strategies to facilitate growth; the 
administered capitalism model was also followed to protect industries in Taiwan, Singapore, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and most South East Asian countries. Similar structures can also be 
found in Italy and Turkey. In Latin America and Spain they assume the name of Grupos 
Economicos. These last have in common the rationale of facilitating development and growth, 
and are often led by charismatic entrepreneurs; like the Asian groups, they are active mainly in 
crucial local sectors (utilities, beverage, publishing, construction and coffee industries).   
Groups in Brazil particularly have represented a growth strategy in the pervading 
bureaucratic environment and the law-ridden system, with the consequent formation of a parallel 
freer economy, mainly to access means of financing. Entrepreneurial activity is difficult in an 
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overregulated environment, especially for starting a new business, hiring and firing, or the 
complexity of the tax system, forcing economic operators to rely upon black markets. 
 The difficulty for small and micro firms, not only to access external funds, having then 
to rely upon internal funding and insider investments, but also to obtain bank loans, has justified 
the tendency to form groups. The institution of the Novo Mercado in 2004 was meant to 
facilitate access to equity markets, allowing at least in principle for firms to benefit from external 
investors funding; changes of control are apparently clearer, but there are still obstacles to 
takeovers. 
 
6. Evolution of business groups in China. 
Although business groups in every country have some distinctive characteristics, the 
a number of important differences from their counterparts in most other emerging economies. 
These differences are likely to make it problematic to explain their formation and rationale with 
exactly the same theories that have been found productive in analyzing business groups in other 
countries.  
This research project critically examines the relationship between product and 
international diversification among Chinese business groups and their economic performance. To 
understand why the causality nexus between scope and performance could be reversed in 
Chinese business groups, it is necessary to review the rationale behind their institution and their 
connection to prevalent political-social forces. 
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Precursors of the modern business groups can be found in the Hong Kong and Taiwanese 
(guan xi qi ye) form of alliances among family firms. However, the characteristic lack of unified 
management direction and indistinct ties of the family coalitions do not allow for a close link to 
the post war, mainly manufacturing-based groups (Chung 1998; Hamilton, Kao 1990); before the 
beginning of the economic reform in the late 1970s, this last prevailing typology of companies in 
China was characterized by dependency from the central planning authority and strict 
government control.  
 Firms, such as SOEs and collective firms whose growth was strictly limited by 
government restrictions, were under the control of various industrial ministries or bureaus at the 
national and local levels. Each industrial ministry or bureau managed, through a system of 
interlocking relationships, a wide range of state-owned and/or collective enterprises that were in 
some way related to the industry segment of the ministry or bureau (e.g., electronics, machine 
building, or chemicals).  The primary objective of the firms was not their performance, but the 
set of social and political priorities indicated by central and local government.  
Economic reforms were introduced starting from 1978, and the Chinese Party Central 
Committee initially promoted forms of cooperation between SOEs similar to those of the 
Japanese Keiretsu, to later allow the creation of non-state owned economic entities. The reforms 
were aimed at setting incentives at firm level, with the parallel effect to improve the 
decision-making structures, and at implementing policies to increase the level of firm autonomy 
from central government. The composite finale purpose was to provide incentives to improve the 
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This first set of reforms and the following, approved in the 1980s, were frustrated by the 
ambiguity between the state and the , which created an 
opportunity for complicity and connivance between central government representatives at the 
local level and the firm  The failure is attributable to the difficulty to 
consolidate and dispose of unprofitable parts of the business, and to the short-term profit 
strategies implemented. The group was then formed prevalently by horizontal association of 
firms, where the affiliates had similar status in the same or different sectors of businesses; their 
interest in joining was to share production facilities, brands or distribution/marketing channels 
coherently with the theory based on the insufficiently developed market mechanism. 
By the late 1980s new reforms brought the adoption of the corporation form, introducing 
the separation between ownership and control through the shareholdings system; groups started 
to form through spin offs, mergers and acquisition of shares (Lee, Jin 2009).  
  In 1986 the term business group was officially introduced to define the forming economic 
entities, indicating the state commitment to support these frameworks as instruments of 
economic and social policies; in the following years the central government formally sanctioned 
the business groups, establishing incentives to the institution of state-owned affiliations, namely 
formed by SOEs, with the aim of exposing a specific sector to foreign markets or acting as a 
catalyst for the rescue of underperforming minor SOEs. In particular, the 1990s were 
characterized by these emerging figures of state holding companies; later the widespread pursuit 
of collective interests induced the state to adapt its policies further in favor of these institutions 
(Lee and Jin, 2009).  
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Private groups, often formed by the initiative of powerful SOE managers, or non-state 
entrepreneurs, started to emerge 93 (Ma, 
2005). At the beginning of the reform, and up to the mid 1990s, the lack of recognition and 
legitimate support for individual businesses, which practically disappeared in the 1950s during 
the socialist reconstruction, led private managers to enter into agreements with local authorities, 
to assimilate private businesses to cooperative forms, according to the practice referred to as 
wearing the red hat. 
Because of the Chinese political asset as a decentralized federal state, t
increased exponentially with aggregations promoted not only at the central level but also by 
provinces and municipalities. The consequent high number of participants, which often lacked 
critical mass or rational justification (Shapiro et al., 2009), triggered the need for consolidation 
and direction policies from the central planners. 
After the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, the effort of the government was aimed at 
supporting large groups in key sectors, bound to compete and succeed internationally; this effort 
was further enhanced by the policies implemented in China to comply with the requirements to 
enter the World Trade Organization, in 2001. For example, the establishment of 
had 
the intent to create a central level shareholder for the state enterprises. The main result was that 
state- ctures were strategically simplified. It was 
and is in the state interest to protect and facilitate its investments in these party-owned groups 
(Ma, 2005).  
-owned or collective enterprises 
faced increasing competition from foreign-invested enterprises, mostly joint ventures in the 
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initial stage, and indigenous entrepreneurial startups; some of them were able to stand up against 
the competition and grow rapidly, along with the foreign-invested and private enterprises. The 
majority of them, however, fell further and further behind in terms of technology and market 
share, suffering mounting losses, and becoming a serious drain on the national economy. 
The government faced a challenging dilemma at the time, because it did not want these 
enterprises to go bankrupt, fearing that the possible layoffs would spark social instability, nor 
wished to engage openly in large-scale privatization due to ideological bias. The challenge was 
to transform these largely inefficient state enterprises into product-region diversified and 
successful  affiliations, apt to face the growing local and international competitive 
pressure, and enhance internationally the country  economic image.  
One of the principal approaches the central government adopted to improve the efficiency 
of the lagging state-owned and collective enterprises was to foster the growth of business groups. 
So the trend that started since the mid to late 1980s, with the intent to develop rapidly the 
Chinese economy, accelerated, producing by 2006, in official records, about 2,900 groups, with 
nearly 28,000 first tier affiliates, and supplying employment to around 30 million people in 
China (Guest, Sutherland, 2009); among those groups about 100 were selected to represent the 
. 
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Beginning in , business groups took shape primarily via the following three   
1. Wholesale transformation of existing industrial ministries/bureaus (or parts thereof) into 
partially state-owned business groups, where the dilution of state shares mainly resulted from 
employee stock ownership and initial public offerings. 
2. Government encouragement, or even coercion, of successful state-owned and collective 
enterprises to acquire their money-losing counterparts in the same or related industries, 
forming a state-owned business group. This common strategic aggregation of firms counted 
on paternalistic policies by the central regulator, which was also the main investor. 
3. -ti-
) also diversified into related and unrelated fields through acquisitions and 
organic expansions, and formed business groups. Entrepreneurs, who started firms and later 
groups, came from the ranks of professionals, specialists-technicians, and even farmers; their 
characteristic was a positive risk-taking constructive attitude, and close acquaintance with the 
network of relationships vital to successfully perform business activities. Several analyses 
have sustained that the role of the private sector has been penalized by policies implemented 
by the government, which actively sustained state-owned enterprises (Xu, Wang, 1999). 
According to government statistics, business groups accounted for nearly 60% of the 
st century. The complexity of the political and 
social environment contingent to their development, and the distinct means by which business 
groups were formed in China, endowed them with a number of unique characteristics, making it 
potentially problematic to explain them with exactly the same theories that have been 
productively employed to study business groups elsewhere. 
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Business groups are characterized by continuous evolution and their complexity is 
underlined by the adoption of market-oriented initiatives constantly in progress: amongst the 
other the opening to acquisition from private and overseas investors, to access controlling stakes 
in domestic companies (Financial Times, Oct. 9th, 2002), and the measures in terms of laws and 
regulations prepared to encourage Renminbi denominated private equity funds and to allow 
Sino-foreign joint ventures (FT, Nov. 16th, 2007). 
Recently President Xi Jinping is undertaking steps to rebalance the economy, maintaining 
stability while promoting growth, through reforms aimed at opening to private players, banks, 
and selected strategic sectors such as energy and telecoms, at present still dominated by state-
owned giants (Reuters, Aug. 8th, 2013). 
 
7. From diversification to growth: groups as instruments for product and geographical 
diversification. 
As articulated by Khanna and Palepu (1997), institutional imperfections in emerging 
economies can cause market transactions to be more costly and thus strengthen the advantage of 
diversified business groups. Their empirical study of business groups in Chile suggests that a 
business group needs to exceed a certain threshold of diversification to benefit sufficiently from 
institutions (Khanna & Palepu ,1997). The crux of this study is that diversification is a potential 
growth instrument and thus an anteced therefore 
supporting the part of the doctrine that sustains a causal relation, moving from diversification to 
growth and performance.  
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The cost-benefit analysis, meanwhile, is expectedly contingent upon the institutional 
environment in which the firm operates (North 1990).  
The most widely adopted theoretical perspective on business groups in emerging 
economies is the New Institutional Economics. Williamson (1985) suggests that the basic 
rationale for a diversified firm to earn more rent than a collection of unaffiliated businesses is 
that the diversified firm, or business group, can mitigate information impactedness in the 
external market and allocate resources, particularly capital, among its various businesses more 
efficiently. However, as a firm expands in size and scope, the marginal administrative cost from 
further expansion will eventually outweigh the marginal benefit, limiting its size and breadth of 
economic activity; consequently, the advantage of group affiliation will diminish over time 
(Carney, Shapiro, Tang, 2009).  
Diversification is, in developing countries, a paramount strategy to promote the growth of 
the economy; business groups in general assume different degrees of product and geographical 
diversification. As maintained in research results collected by Xuqin and Xin (2011), they 
concluded that a strategy of focused diversification outperforms unrelated or no diversification. 
It should be noted that recently strategies to business refocusing have been adopted 
worldwide because of internal and/or external inefficiencies observed in business groups, both in 
developed and developing economies. The industrial rationale behind these policies is the main 
reason for downsizing and re-scaling of the businesses, especially in advanced economies, but 
other reasons can trigger focusing strategies: exogenous factors like shifts in competition trends, 
cultural factors, or changes in market institutions.  
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 It is not univocally proven whether or not downsizing, even coupled with acceleration in the 
privatization process, would achieve better results in developing countries. In particular, in China 
several factors have indicated that business groups are less likely to refocus their activity; this is 
because the privatization process is taking place at a gradual pace, groups are powerful and have 
strong performance, relational norms are emphasized, and business groups are exhibiting a high 
level of trust in terms of reputational or social capital (Hoskisson, 2005). 
The basic idea of the diversification theory has been recently applied to the study of 
business groups in China, usually combined with other perspectives on product and international 
diversification (e.g., Li & Wong 2003; Lu & Yao 2006; Ma et al. 2006; Yiu et al. 2005).  
The study of international diversification and its effects has assumed particular relevance for 
China. Chinese geographical business expansion recorded Outward Foreign Direct Investment in 
2012 of UDS billion 62.4, marking a year-on-
the same period decrea
business groups account for most of this foreign economic commitment2. 
revenues of the largest 500 groups accounting for 62- -
2006 (Yiu, 2010). 
 
By adopting a multi-theoretic approach, this stream of research finds not only a 
relationship between diversification and performance, but also direct or moderating influences of 
diversification strategies and institutional factors on the relationship. For instance, Yiu and 
colleagues (2005) found that groups with less state ownership or more engaged in acquisition or 
                                                 
2 Yiu (2010) reports that in 2
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international diversification tend to perform better; it appears that mature groups with higher 
independence from the initial bureaucracy-centered economic boost enjoy economic advantages 
when adopting internationalization strategies. 
Group affiliation, on the other hand, enables access to a specialized environment able to 
supply otherwise missing or inaccessible sets of institutional goods and services; this produces 
the bases for endogenous and exogenous growth in a firm-like ownership, locations, and 
internalization (OLI) advantages, which in turn generate linkage, leverage and leaning (LLL) 
opportunities (Yiu, 2009).  
Chinese firm  international diversification and expansion often represents a mechanism 
for the group to gain strategic knowledge and potential and to benefit from different institutional 
environments, mitigating administrative constraints (e.g. to obtain manufacturing license). This 
perspective composes the traditional frameworks where OLI and LLL models are considered 
complementary; with OLI more indicated to explain established incumbents  behaviors, and their 
aim to grow, exploiting their own advantages, and LLL appropriate in the case of latecomer 
entrants in a new market looking to enhance opportunities and knowledge. 
Chinese business groups mostly achieved the successful geographical diversification 
pursued by the central planners at the time these strategic organizations were established. Yiu 
reports that with regard to internationalization performance in 2006, 79.9% of the groups under 
state administration were profitable and 17.6% lossmaking; 2.5% broke even. According to this 
study, group affiliation grants to Chinese firms a distinctive local and multinational edge (Yiu, 
2010). 
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On the other hand, Lu and Yao (2006) find product diversification to be more positively related 
to performance in state-owned groups, and Ma and colleagues (2006) find that affiliation with a 
business group is more positively related to performance when a firm is state-owned.  
Taken together, this stream of research demonstrates not only the potential of the New 
Institutional Economics approach but also the importance of combining it with other 
complementary theoretical perspectives in the study of business groups in China. In the 
meantime, this stream of work so far still does not univocally indicate whether diversification is 
an antecedent or consequence of performance, given that the better-performing state-owned 
firms have often been pressured to acquire their poor performing counterparts in related 
industries and thus become business groups; furthermore, the central government plays a crucial 
role in licensing and authorizing foreign economic activity to all the economic operators, hence, 
intervening in their geographical diversification.  
8.  and political institutions: bureaucracy impact factor on 
business groups. 
economic institutions over time and distinguish Chinese business groups into different types that 
are differentially affected by the changes in the overall institutional environment. Given the 
different ways in which they were formed, as summarized above, there are likely to exist three 
distinct but overlapping populations of business groups in China: the converted wholesale from 
former industrial bureaus; those that are centered around a private entrepreneur or Ge-ti-hu; and 
those that developed from successful state-owned enterprises and grew under government 
guidance and sometimes pressure through acquisition.  
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It is evident that the impact of state decisions and relations promoted crucial firms  
affiliations in the Chinese economic scene, justifying the institutions of business groups not only 
as a reaction to market voids, but also as a product of the concurrence of political strategies.  
The market-voids school of thought maintains that the institutions evolved with the market 
minimize the importance of political connections, giving space to business groups that initially 
aggregate to benefit from size and breadth, and are bound to lose momentum when institutions 
are available. The view based on state-induced affiliation in groups instead sees aggregation as a 
pretext to bring forward the excellence of a state industrial champion, allowing its performance 
to positively affect other affiliates.   
The analyses based on the market voids presume that the market economy lessens the 
importance of political relations, suggesting as a likely 
WTO in 2001, when the relevance of guanxi is seen as rapidly diminishing to make space to new 
formal institutions required by global regulations. On the other end, the state role view proposes 
that the new socioeconomic institutions require a high degree of adaptation from the firms that 
can continue to benefit from their political connections through new forms of social ties 
(Haveman et al., 2013).  
The economic development process has involved the shift of industrial control from 
central to a mix of local administration and private hands, including foreign entrants; the 
emergence of markets to exchange economic and financial goods; and the development to 
safeguard property rights from the pervading local and international competition (Naughton, 
2007). Bureaucrats have influenced in the past the affiliations of firms into groups and still affect 
their performance through the control they exert upon resources such as land, capital, 
government contracts and their power to authorize activities and therefore protect markets and 
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players. In this way the reach of political power does not affect only state-owned or participated 
firms, but can influence any market operator, public or private. 
Remarkably, China in the past 35 years has shifted from a system of state socialism to 
what has recently been defined as a mix of state-guided and entrepreneurial capitalism; this 
economic development and the evolution of new institutions have not been reflected in parallel 
political reforms, with the country displaying little or no change in the political institutions. 
Because administrative roles remained relatively unaffected by the economic ferment, political 
connections increased their value for business activity. However, the political, relatively static 
course has not reflected a similarly static trend in social values: a shift has been observed from 
traditional values centered on the relevance of community and network connections toward more 
western individualistic values (Liu and Wang, 2009). 
In the past, the role of bureaucrats was mainly allocating and redistributing resources; 
now state agents act as increasingly powerful economic actors, as regulators or brokers of market 
transactions. With a developing market and economy, the lack of a parallel reform in the political 
scene has meant that the relationship network system has acquired new strength because of its 
strategic role to mediate access to strategic, state-controlled resources, to grant the essential 
authorizations for opening new businesses, and to guarantee property rights regulations and 
enforcement. One of the main points of the analyses considered is the empirical support 
displaying an increasing trend, especially in areas where market development was more 
remarkable, of the value of political ties over time, and in industries subject to stronger 
competition; the more competitive an industry is, the higher the level of uncertainty a firm must 
face, and the more valuable a strong connection is to the bureaucrats. The benefits of political 
networking also were more effective for smaller dimension firms (Haveman et al., 2013).  
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Although business groups were not normally pressured by the government to expand 
internationally, they are also more likely to succeed in international expansion because of their 
stronger technological and managerial expertise than their peers in China. Some studies did find 
firms with greater international diversification to be more profitable, but the same cause and 
effect question also exists in this respect and should be examined with the same theoretical and 
methodological approach as with regard to the product diversification.  
Literature on the above-mentioned types is not exhaustive, nor does it provide a univocal 
forecast. Since the economic operators that evolved from state-owned companies were 
particularly susceptible to government pressure to acquire poor-performing companies in related 
and sometimes unrelated industries, some of the relationships found in extant studies might 
reflect primarily the diversification-performance relationship in this specific type of groups. In 
order to ascertain the causality of the relationship, research should satisfy the needs to identify 
groups of this type as a separate population, collect longitudinal data and use statistical models 
that can either test causality directly (e.g., Granger regression), control for firm and time effects 
(e.g., panel data models), or treat acquisition as a selection equation in the model.  
Finally, China has undergone rapid economic and institutional changes that may be 
viewed as exhibiting the pattern of punctuated equilibrium, and these changes have impacted the 
competitive conditions of different industries in a differential manner. So, it is also important to 
take into account the competitive conditions in each industry in any analysis of the 
diversification-performance relationship for business groups in China. This is particularly 
pronounced for business groups that resulted from the conversion of former industrial bureaus, 
because one may further categorize groups of this type into two subtypes: those that fall in 
relatively high-technology industries and have been groomed as national champions, and those 
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that fall in low-technology industries facing stiff competition from non-state players. In higher-
technology industries, the national champions are likely to engage in related diversification to 
strengthen their market positions, while in highly competitive low-technology industries the still 
surviving groups may be forced to engage in extensive unrelated diversification. The 
performance implications of the differing strategies and their interaction with industry conditions 
can be very different. Indicators of industry conditions include not only the level of technology 
intensity, but also the relative role of private and/or foreign players in the industry. 
9. Private sector and groups. 
Literature coverage of the gradual development from 1978 of the private sector in China 
is currently being supplemented, due to the fact that before the reform, particularly after the 
1953-56 socialist reconstruction, private property and initiative was considered an ideologically 
hostile concept and disappeared in China. 
 The first forms of private business accepted were units that hired less than five 
employees; hiring more was prohibited until 1988, when new dispositions admitted a broader 
spectrum of private activity, which was typified mainly by sole ownership, partnership, and 
limited liability incorporation. Estimates give the number of individual businesses in China in 
1988 at 500,000 (Liu, 2003).  
The private sector is now relevant in the new political, economic and social asset that 
China has been assuming since the 1978 reforms, when SOEs accounted for 77.6 % of industrial 
output: private enterprises have been growing at an accelerated pace, and from the early to mid-
1990s, the official private sector has been growing at an average of 35% per year. 
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In 2006 private enterprises accounted for 37.2% of industrial output, while SOEs 
decreased to 31.2%.  In the same year, foreign-funded enterprises, including Hong Kong and 
Macau, amounted to 31.6 %, bringing the total weight of the private sector at 65% of gross 
domestic product; generally, the number of private businesses hardly includes collectively-
owned enterprises, such as those owned by cities, urban districts and communities, but 
individuals and other enterprises. 
probably due to different, non-homogeneous calculation tools; for example, China does not 
explicitly supply certain indicators, like the private sector output, but the relative data can be 
evinced residually from the figures provided at national level, corrected and integrated by the 
state and collective-owned sectors  (He, 2009). According to the Hurun Rich List, 
Forbes equivalent source, in 2010 the number of individuals with a personal wealth of at 
economic and political elites, now also at private business level (ten Brink, 2013). 
Groups centered around the figure of a private entrepreneur are often considered to have 
a greedy Ge-ti-hu mentality  easily attracted to quick profit, lacking a coherent strategy and 
possessing a limited scope of knowledge and learning capacity because they got rich by being 
highly opportunistic at a time when central planning left many holes in the market for private 
entrepreneurs to fill.  Most preconceptions derive cialist, anti 
 , where 
entrepreneurial activities were markers of lower status. 
Part of the microeconomic doctrine justifies the formations of private groups also as a 
tool to open to and protect private ownership rights. One of the feared prerogatives of the state, 
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especially during the first decade of the reforms, was to assume ownership and control over any 
asset (Ahlstrom et al. 2008). The possible threat of the state challenging private property rights 
suggested the adoption of defensive strategies for private firms: strategies involved cultivating 
relations with government officials, taking over poorly performing state-owned enterprises, 
disguising registering as a collective enterprise the private business as a practice of informal 
privatization, the so called wearing a red hat , or donating services to the local community, in 
this way promoting again the expansion of the activity of the firm. These strategies were carrying 
not only the safe recognition from central and local governments, but also valuable practical 
benefits, such as favorable tax treatments and preferential access to loans and bank credit in 
general (Estrin, Prevezer, 2010).  
 diversification may be highly susceptible to the capabilities of the 
dominant entrepreneur, so any examination of the relationship between diversification and 
performance in this type of groups should take into account the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur-manager and his or her top management team. Further research can perhaps benefit 
the upper echelon perspective in traditional strategy research. Here, again, it is important to treat 
groups of this type as a distinct population. 
The modality of the birth and flourishing of a private sector in China witnesses the 
coexistence of market-oriented entrepreneurial initiative with the pervading role of the 
centralized and decentralized authority. The two spheres are strictly connected, displaying how 
the Chinese mixed economy contemplates different concepts of competition and freedom of the 
actors, due to the interlocking relations in the political, economic and social system, according to 
the above-mentioned embeddedness of the state in the economic and social life. Therefore the 
case of private groups also seems crucial for understanding the commixed causal nexus between 
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diversification and performance and the contribution and intervention of the inter-relationships 
between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, although the most recent messages from Chinese and 
world economic authorities witness openings to a structure prone to the private initiative. 
According to the latest projections of the IMF, in 2013 GDP growth in China averaged 
7.7% with a low 7.2 for the private sector. Further data on Chinese companies showed 
 
In the country notes (p. 123) issued for China by the OECD in 2013 there is the 
state intervention in the private sector and the financial markets and by enhancing the rule of 
 and Zhang Weiying, former president of the Guanghua School of management of Peking, 
unknown small companies have ultimately became influential international groups through 
 
10. Concluding remarks. 
The aim of this research project is to offer a review of the propositions by recent 
literature to examine the emergence and success of business groups in China, underlying the 
causal relationship between product and international diversification, and performance; the 
review of theories is integrated with empirical studies that adopted longitudinal data, allowing to 
give a temporal dimension to the development of the relationship.  
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Available literature indicates a positive correlation between the size and scope of 
business groups and their performance, confirming also the possibility of the inverse causal 
nexus in the case of China, based upon the socio-political contingencies at the time of group 
formation.  
 Historic social and political contingencies led China to policies promoting firms with 
successful performances as leaders in the process of affiliation, which consequently resulted in 
successful business groups, reversing the causal relation between group affiliation and growth, 
diversification and performance, which for most developing countries is a univocal correlation, 
moving from size and breadth to higher returns at group level. 
As highlighted by the study of Carney (et al., 2009), which focused on the temporal 
dynamics of business groups, not all the firms benefit from group affiliation, mainly because of 
the incidence of tunneling behaviors (for example when managers extract resources from 
companies with low cash-flow rights). Non-univocal evidence is offered about the impact of 
long-term group affiliation on the single 
on an initial positive impact from affiliation when formal infrastructures are still not available, 
but with benefits from affiliation diminishing over time, leaving scope for reversing the positive 
co
 
Many aspects of the causality nexus between diversification and performance in Chinese 
business groups still remain unexplored, or just partially or non-empirically researched by 
existing studies.  
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Tangible difficulties to obtain a univocal model and forecast are also given by 
methodologies relying upon the existence and availability of homogeneous, historical sets of 
data. To give an example of the accounting problems in collecting longitudinal data, there are 
difficulties to access standard audited data for firms. Also, in the Chinese stock exchange the so 
called  companies can be found, namely firms that posted negative earnings 
for two consecutive years and risk to be delisted.  
The methodology also needs refinements to suitably measure the weight of group 
participation, at present still for simplification purposes, represented through dummy variables, 
and implying that state policies affect in the same way large and smaller groups. 
  Further empirical insight should include testing formulated theorizations, given that 
several complex propositions are still not unanimously accepted, like the negative effect of 
unrelated diversification or the contextualization of the institutional voids hypothesis; the role of 
state intervention with the creation of new infrastructures.   
The impact of the contribution from the private sector should also be reviewed and tested 
according to the new role it is adopting, considering the growing weight it is assuming in the 
economy.
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